Three days after Indian and Chinese military commanders met on Saturday in Chushul, Ladakh, to discuss the crisis posed by the two armies traditionally occupied by thousands of Chinese soldiers in the area, top military sources in India swiftly reformed Sought to illustrate the situation. .
Claiming that the two sides – the People’s Liberation Army (PLA) and the Indian Army – “retreated slightly” after Saturday’s meeting, army sources revealed that another Sino-Indian meeting was held at a more junior level on Wednesday Will.
However, sources on the ground portray a distant picture of Chinese incursions along the Line of Actual Control (LAC). He says that during the negotiations, PLA negotiators rejected the Indian demand for Chinese troops to withdraw from their occupied territories in May and restore the status quo to prevail in April.
In fact, during military-to-military talks on Saturday, China refused to discuss its incursion into the Galvan River Valley, rather than claiming ownership over the entire region.
Underlining these sharp conflicts between Indian and Chinese positions, no joint statement was issued after Leh Corps commander Lt Gen Harinder Singh called on PLA Major General Liu Lin, who called on the South Xinjiang military to thwart the confrontation. Was the head of the region.
Nor did New Delhi release any details about the military discussion. On Tuesday, top sources in the army presented the media with a military version of the events after sharp criticism from opposition members including Congress party Rahul Gandhi.
According to their version, the Indian and Chinese core commanders met each other for about three hours before engaging further during delegate-level talks. The two sides “identified five places of mutual consent and conflict” between the PLA and Indian troops. These include Pangong Tso Lake and the northern coast of Chushul, Patrolling Point 14 (PP14), PP15, PP17.
The fact that these conflict sites do not make any mention of the Gallavan River Valley is believed to argue that the area was not on the agenda for discussion.
Galvan River Valley
During the negotiations, the PLA indicated that they were taking control of the Galvan River Valley, which has traditionally been a peaceful area where China followed a claim line. Now PLA negotiators have claimed ownership of the entire Galvan Valley, claiming that China controlled the hillside along the Galvan River for as long as they can remember.
The PLA alleged that India had built a one-kilometer-long track from the Shyok-Galvan River Junction, heading east along the Galawan River, an encroachment of Chinese territory. He alleged that India is developing this track as a metal (black-topped) road.
Representatives of the Indian Army counted that the Chinese had built a metal road where the LAC was present until May – which flows into the Galawan Shyok River, five kilometers away – and that the road would soon cross the LAC. The Chinese responded that the Galvan Valley is their territory and it was legitimate for them to build a road in it.
Indian interlocutors also objected to the deployment of PLA troops in the area around Gogra post. Sources say the PLA did not give a vague response.
Nor was there a vague PLA response to Indian allegations that the Chinese were building a road on the LAC between Hot Springs and Gogra towards India.
Pangong Tso Region
Responding to Indian allegations of Chinese incursions into the Pangong Tso North Bank, PLA negotiators claimed that they “worked correctly” in constructing a blighted road to Finger 4 and preparing defensive positions in that disputed area.
Before May, the Indian Army regularly patrolled Finger 8 to eight kilometers east of Finger 8 to its alleged LAC. However, since May 5, when thousands of PLA troops blocked and outpaced Indian troops in that area, unable to go beyond Finger 4, which the Chinese now claim is LAC.
Chinese military officials acknowledged that the aggression with which PLA soldiers attacked Indian troops in Pangong Tso in mid-May was “not in the right spirit,” but it surpassed the PLA version of the Indian Army patrol LAC There was a response to do.
The Indian Army also brought up the need to reduce further deployment of PLA soldiers, armored vehicles and artillery guns. The Chinese responded that they would have to refer the matter to their superiors.
Profit and Loss
Army sources say the PLA has strategically gained an edge in the Galawan Valley, where they now occupy positions on the strategic Darbuk-Shyok-Doulet Beg Oldi (DSDBO) road to Dengsang at the base of the Karakoram Pass. Let’s do it.